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DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
determinative of the issues presented for review. The complete 
text of Rule 56 is reproduced in the addendum of appellant's 
principal brief. Determinative decisions in this case are Clover 
v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991) and Birkner v, 
Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989). Copies of these 
cases are also reproduced in the addendum of appellant's 
principal brief. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TORT FEASOR'S ACTS WERE MOTIVATED, 
AT LEAST IN PART, BY THE PURPOSE OF SERVING 
THE EMPLOYER'S INTEREST 
In order to insure a proper application of the elements 
announced by the Utah Supreme Court in Birkner v. Salt Lake 
County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989), this court should 
look to see how the particular elements of the Birkner test have 
been applied in other cases. Most importantly, this court should 
compare the facts of the case at bar with those found in Clover 
v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991) .* 
xThis court should take note that although the case of Clover 
v. Snowbird Ski Resort was discussed at length in Appellant's 
Principal Brief, appellee has not addressed this case at all. The 
Clover case represents the Utah Supreme Court's holding on how the 
issue of the scope of employment should be determined on summary 
judgment. 
1 
The negligent act of which plaintiff complains in this case 
was the tort feasor's retrieval of a firearm because of the 
presence of a suspicious individual at the Delle Auto Truck Stop. 
In order to determine whether this employee's acts were 
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving his 
master, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances, 
including whether the employee was accomplishing the tasks 
assigned him by his employer at the time of the negligent act. 
Defendant attempts to isolate this court's view of the negligent 
act by labeling the tort feasor's actions as the "cleaning" of a 
gun, as if plaintiff had asserted that the negligent act was the 
manner in which the employee cleaned the firearm. Plaintiff has 
never claimed that Mr. Cowdell was negligent solely because of 
how he cleaned his gun.2 Instead, the employee's act of going 
out to his car and returning to the store with the firearm was 
the negligent act. Whether the suspicious person had left the 
store seconds or minutes before the accident is immaterial; the 
2
 Again, as in plaintiff's principal brief, plaintiff would 
remind the court that the employee, Mr. Cowdell, was not really 
cleaning his gun. Instead, he "stuck a thing in the back of the 
[the gun] to get some dust out of it and it just discharged." 
(Cowdell Dep. at 8, 10) . A more accurate description of Mr. 
Cowdell's activities would be fiddling. He pushed a little piece 
of wire into the firearm with "a little piece of tissue I put on 
the end of it and stuck it in the cylinder. I stuck it in, I 
pushed and kind of winded around and pushed on it and that is when 
the bullet went off." (Cowdell Dep. at 23). 
2 
origin of the dirt in the gun is equally irrelevant. 
The fact remains, Mr. Cowdell never completely deviated from 
his business responsibilities, but continued to do his employer's 
work. If, when the employee left the store to retrieve the 
firearm, his only concern was for his personal safety, with no 
concern whatsoever for his employerfs interest, he would have 
remained outside the store. Instead, he returned to the store 
with the firearm and resumed his post at the cash register. The 
employee's return to the store highlights that the employee was 
about his master's business. The court in Clover stated, "[I]f 
the employee has resumed the duties of employment, the employee 
is then 'about the employer's business' and the employee's 
actions will be 'motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of 
serving the employer's interest."' Clover, 808 P.2d at 1042. 
Two fact patterns illustrate this point. In Clover, an 
employee of Snowbird Ski Resort, along with another employee of 
the resort, skied four runs before heading down the mountain to 
begin their shifts. Id. at 1039. On the final run, the employee 
decided to jump off a crest on the side of an intermediate run. 
The employer knew of this jump, and often instructed people not 
to jump off this crest. There was a sign instructing skiers to 
ski slowly at that point on the run. The employee ignored the 
sign and skied over the crest. When the employee went over the 
3 
jump, he collided with the plaintiff who was hit in the head and 
severely injured. Id. The defendant, Snowbird, claimed that the 
employee's purpose for skiing the additional four runs was for 
his own pleasure and that he was therefore not acting within the 
scope of employment as a matter of law. The Supreme Court of 
Utah disagreed. Clover, 808 P.2d at 1041. 
Defendant in the case at bar maintains that the third 
element of Birkner, that the employee's conduct must be 
motivated, at least in part# by the purpose of serving his 
employer's interest, focuses on the employee's state of mind. 
This is not accurate. It is obvious from the application of the 
facts in Clover to the standard announced in Birkner that the 
Clover court looked to the totality of the circumstances and did 
not look into the subjective mental impressions of the employee. 
It is inconceivable that at the moment when the employee in 
Clover shot off the ski jump he was thinking about Snowbird's 
interests. More likely, he was thinking about the "hang time" he 
was enjoying, or perhaps about landing correctly. 
In fact, in looking at the third element of the Birkner 
test, the Clover court examined whether the employee's deviation 
was so substantial as to constitute a total abandonment of 
employment. The court found: "Under the circumstances of the 
instant case, it is entirely possible for a jury to reasonably 
4 
believe that at the time of accident, [the employee] has resumed 
his employment and that [the employee's] deviation was not 
substantial enough to constitute a total abandonment of 
employment." Jd. at 1042. For this reason, the Clover court 
concluded that the matter should not have been decided on Summary 
Judgment. Likewise, in the case at bar, the evidence before the 
trial court was not so one sided as to indicate that the 
employee's deviation was substantial enough to constitute a total 
abandonment of employment. The facts of the case indicate that 
the employee was, in fact, about his employer's business behind 
the cash register. 
If one were to follow the defendant's line of reasoning, in 
almost all circumstances an employer would not be found liable 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. An employer could 
instruct employees in a trucking firm not to pass other vehicles. 
Circumstances could arise where the employee, nonetheless, 
attempts to pass a vehicle, and when seeing an oncoming vehicle, 
swerves to avoid an accident, colliding with a third party. When 
asked what was going through his mind at the time of the 
accident, almost any reasonable person would state that they were 
trying to avoid getting hurt, not thinking about their employer's 
interest. Universally, however, such an accident would be 
considered within the employee's scope of employment. 
5 
The court in Clover noted that if the employee had not 
accomplished some of the assignments his employer had given him, 
it would have been necessary to send a second employee to 
accomplish the same purpose. Clover, 808 P.2d at 1042. The same 
facts arise here. If the employee, in perceiving the threat of 
the suspicious individual, had left the store, no one else would 
have been there. Had the employer been aware of this, the 
employer would have needed to send someone else. 
In Jefferson v. Rose Oil Co.. 232 So.2d 896 (La. Ct. App. 
1970), a gas station cashier shot a customer during a dispute 
over the customer's failure to pay for gas which had already been 
pumped. Defendant states that insuring payment for 83 cents in 
gas was one of the attendant's duties. (Defendant's brief at 
10). Contrary to this assertion, the court in Jefferson states: 
"It may well be that he was not authorized to use force in 
collecting for merchandise sold. Nevertheless, [the employee] 
was attempting to collect for the price of the gasoline already 
placed in plaintiff's tank. This was in furtherance of the 
employer's business as distinguished from any personal 
controversy that may have existed between [the employee] and 
plaintiff." Id. at 898. 
It is disputed as to whether Mr. Cowdell, the employee, had 
been told whether or not he could possess a gun. It is 
6 
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Reasonable minds can differ as to whether the employee was 
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving his 
employer^ interest. As a result, summary judgment was improper, 
and the trial courtfs judgment should be reversed. 
THE EMPLOYEE'S CONDUCT WAS OF THE GENERAL KIND 
THAT HE WAS EMPLOYED TO PERFORM 
The court in Birkner stated, and the court in Clover 
reaffirmed, that the definition of whether an employee's conduct 
is of the general kind he is employed to perform is: "The 
employee must be about the employerfs business and the duties 
assigned by the employer, as opposed to being wholly involved in 
a personal endeavor." Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 
1053, 1056-57; Clover. 808 P.2d at 1040 (emphasis added). Both 
parties concede that at the time of the accident, the employee 
was behind the cash register, tending to the business which his 
employer had assigned him. No argument has been made that he was 
wholly involved in a personal endeavor. Instead, he was doing 
exactly what his employer had asked him to do.3 
Defendant cites the case of Hein v. Harris County. 557 S.W. 
3
 Defendant would argue that he was not doing what his 
employer had asked him to do in that he had a firearm. However, 
the facts must be construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, 
and plaintiff has stated that the employer never told him not to 
carry a firearm. 
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Appeals1 analysis as to the scope of employment in Olson 
represents a view that is much more restrictive than Utah law, 
not exemplifying the flexibility highlighted in Clover, The 
Birkner test, found in Utah jurisprudence, exhibits some 
flexibility so that it can be reconciled individually with any 
given set of facts. M[T]his court has occasionally used 
variations of [the Birkner] approach. These variations, however, 
are not departures from the criteria advanced in Birkner. 
Rather, they are methods of applying criteria to specific factual 
situations." Clover. 808 P.2d at 1041. 
The Olson decision is mostly conclusory, short on analysis 
and facts, and distinguishable for the following reasons. Like 
the case at bar, the court in Olson was faced with a dispute 
where the parties had conceded that the accident occurred within 
the spatial boundaries and normal time of the employee's 
authorized employment. The court found that the activity 
precedent to the injury was not actuated in part by any desire to 
serve the master. Olson, 534 P.2d at 1075. In Olson, for 
reasons that the court could not find in the record below, the 
employee pulled his gun from the holster and a third party was 
shot. At the time, the employee had stopped at a gas station to 
buy some gas at a gas station where the victim worked as 
attendant. 
10 
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and its employees. The duty of the employer to supervise his 
employee can arise even outside the scope of employment. 
Appelleefs Brief at 19-20; Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 
1986). The court in Lane stated: 
For example, an employer must exercise reasonable care to 
control an employee acting outside the scope of employment 
to prevent that employee from creating an •unreasonable risk 
of harm to others' if the employee is using an employer's 
chattel and the employer 'knows or should know of the 
necessity and opportunity for exercising control'. 
Lane. 731 P.2d at 492 (quoting Restatement 2d Torts § 317 
(1965)). 
An application of the Restatement of Torts cited by the 
court in Lane, and cited by defendant in its brief, is not 
completely applicable to this case. In Lane, the action 
surrounded the use of a vehicle by an employee in the services of 
his employer. Therefore, the court in Lane focused on the 
particular facts of that case. 
More applicable to the case at bar would be the Restatement 
Torts 2d § 317's provisions concerning when a servant is on the 
premises of the master, not the use of the master's chattel as in 
Lane. 
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so as 
to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his 
employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming 
others or from so conducting himself as to create an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if 
(a) the servant 
12 
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master 
or upon which the servant is privileged to enter 
only as his servant, or 
(ii) is using a chattel of the master; and 
(b) the master 
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the 
ability to control his servant, and 
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and 
opportunity for exercising such control, 
(Emphasis added). 
In the case at bar, the servant was upon the master's 
premises, and had the master exercised any prudent measure of 
supervision, he would have known that the employee was too young 
to serve in the capacity appointed, and he may have become aware 
that Mr. Cowdell was in the possession of a firearm. The 
Restatement does not require that the master actually know 
anything, only that he has a reason to know of his ability to 
control his servant, which must be conceded in this case, and 
also that the employer should know the necessity and opportunity 
of exercising such control. 
The facts before this court show that the employer took no 
steps to know of the necessity or opportunity for exercising such 
control. In fact, there was no supervision at all, and any 
training in regard to this employment was almost nonexistent. 
In Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resortf the trial court had 
erroneously dismissed the plaintifffs negligent supervision 
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claim. Clover, 808 P.2d at 1048. The plaintiff had claimed that 
Snowbird was negligent in not supervising its employees in regard 
to the practice of reckless skiing. Clover produced evidence 
that Snowbird furnished ski passes to employees, was aware of the 
dangerous condition created by the jump, and did not do anything 
to prevent people from taking the jump. That evidence alone was 
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact in regard to 
Clover's negligent supervision claim. Id. 
In the case at bar, there was no supervision at all. 
Plaintiff claims that a complete lack of supervision can be 
negligence and that the issue of negligence should be submitted 
to the jury for determination. Plaintiff claims that the 
employee was too young to perform the job given him under the 
circumstances. Those circumstances include the suspicious 
clientele to be expected at the establishment and the hours at 
which the young person worked. The employee had little, if any, 
training in regard to his employment. Also, plaintiff claims 
that defendant's violation of state liquor laws evidences an 
overall negligent attitude towards the supervision of it's 
employees. Numerous problems regarding the employment of Mr. 
Cowdell were completely foreseeable by his employer. The manager 
of the Delle Auto Truck Stop assumed that Mr. Cowdell owned a 
firearm. (Morris Dep. at 21) These factors raise a genuine 
14 
issue of material fact as to the negligence of Delle Auto Truck 
Stop in the supervision of Mr. Cowdell. Accordingly, summary 
judgment should not have been granted, and this court should 
reverse the trial court. 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the 
trial court also exhibit that the trial court was not looking to 
whether the supervision of the employee was proper, but whether 
the hiring of the employee was proper. Plaintiff has contended 
that it was the supervision of Mr. Cowdell and his training which 
was negligently carried out. The court stated in its findings of 
fact that the employer was not aware of any bizarre behavior nor 
was there evidence of abnormal attire# such as "rambo" type of 
attire, nor that the employee ever made any bizarre or unusual 
statements. The court also found as fact that there was no 
evidence that the employee was unfit to perform his job. 
(R. 104-105). 
The trial court overlooked the fact that there was no 
supervision or training of its employee at all. Simply 
contending that an employer is unaware of problems does not 
absolve the employer of liability when no supervision whatsoever 
is undertaken. Accordingly, summary judgment was improperly 
granted when the matter should have been submitted to a jury. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
Both parties have conceded that this accident occurred within 
the spatial boundaries and times set aside for this employee's job. 
The employee in this matter had resumed the duties of employment, 
and was therefore about his employerfs business. His actions 
were therefore motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of 
serving his employer's interest. The employee was not wholly 
involved in a personal endeavor, but was behind the cash 
register. His acts were of the general kind which his employer 
had assigned him to do. The negligent act in this case was Mr. 
Cowdell's going to his vehicle to retrieve a firearm in response 
to a suspicious entering the truck stop. This entire action 
arises out of his employment, and therefore his actions should be 
found within the scope of employment. 
A genuine issue of material fact exists whether any 
supervision was made by the employer in regard to Mr. Cowdell. 
The plaintiff has shown that the employee was of a particularly 
young age, had no supervision, little if any training, that the 
employer was violating Utahfs liquor laws, and that problems 
could be foreseen. Accordingly, summary judgment should not have 
been granted. 
16 
Plaintiff asks this court to reverse the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment and remand the matter for trial. 
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